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ABSTRACT: Central Mediterranean migrations have led to a series of initiatives by successive 
Italian governments, initiatives aimed at countering the arrival in the ports of the Peninsula of boats 
with people rescued at sea. Two are the guidelines followed: the “outsourcing” of the migratory 
phenomenon’s management, which began in particular through the “Memorandum of Understanding 
on migrants” stipulated with the government of Tripoli on 2 February 2017; and the “disengagement” 
with respect to Search and Rescue activities at sea, gradually limiting the direct involvement and 
above all discouraging these operations by NGOs, “guilty” of attracting rescued persons to the 
Italian jurisdiction.
In 2018 and 2019, the two so called “security decrees” arrived. These decrees provide, among 
other things, measures to combat the phenomenon of irregular migration by sea at all costs, including 
through a progressive detachment from the international commitments undertaken.
In this Note I would like to dwell in particular on a single aspect of the “security decree bis” (n. 
53/19 converted by law n. 77 of 8 August 2019) which concerns the interpretation of the right of 
innocent passage in the territorial sea, an institution codified by the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea signed in Montego Bay in 1982 and ratified by Italy in 1994.
KEYWORDS: Migrations, Italy, NGOs, right of innocent passage, disembarkation, asylum, 
territorial sea, port, internal waters, Law of the Sea, United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Seas (UNCLOS).
EXPERIENCIAS EUROMEDITERRÁNEAS DE GESTIÓN DE LA GOBERNANZA 
MIGRATORIA
RESUMEN: La inmigración en el Mediterráneo Central ha dado lugar a una serie de iniciativas 
por parte de los sucesivos gobiernos italianos destinadas a contrarrestar la llegada a los puertos de 
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la Península de embarcaciones con personas rescatadas en el mar. Dos son las directrices seguidas: 
la «externalización» de la gestión del fenómeno migratorio, que comenzó en particular a través del 
«Memorando de Entendimiento sobre los migrantes» estipulado con el gobierno de Trípoli el 2 de 
febrero de 2017; y la «desvinculación» con respecto a las actividades de Búsqueda y Rescate en el 
mar, limitando gradualmente la participación directa y sobre todo desalentando estas operaciones por 
parte de las ONG, «culpables» de atraer a las personas rescatadas a la jurisdicción italiana.
En 2018 y 2019, llegaron los dos llamados «decretos de seguridad». Estos decretos prevén, 
entre otras cosas, medidas para combatir a toda costa el fenómeno de la migración irregular por mar, 
incluso a través de un desprendimiento progresivo de los compromisos internacionales asumidos.
En esta nota me gustaría detenerme en particular en un único aspecto del «decreto de seguridad 
bis» (n. 53/19 convertido por la ley n. 77 del 8 de agosto de 2019) que se refiere a la interpretación 
del derecho de paso inocente en el mar territorial, institución codificada por la Convención de las 
Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar firmada en Montego Bay en 1982 y ratificada por Italia 
en 1994.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Migraciones, Italia, ONG, derecho de paso inocente, desembarco, asilo, 
mar territorial, puerto, aguas interiores, Derecho del Mar, Convención de Naciones Unidas sobre 
Derecho del Mar (CNUDM).
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well known that, with the downsizing of  the “Balkan route” 
following the 2016 “Statement” between EU Member States and Turkey2 
as well as the policy of  closure implemented by the so-called “Visegrad 
group”’s countries3, the progressive and consequent pressure in the central 
Mediterranean, and especially on Italy, has led to a series of  initiatives by 
successive Italian governments, initiatives aimed at countering the arrival in 
the ports of  the Peninsula of  boats with people rescued at sea. Two are the 
guidelines followed, obviously connected to each other: the “outsourcing” 
of  the migratory phenomenon’s management, which began in particular 
through the “Memorandum of  Understanding on migrants” stipulated with 
2 On which see Carrera, S., Den Hertog, L., Stefan, M., “The EU-Turkey deal. Reversing 
‘Lisbonisation’ in EU migration and asylum policies”, in Carrera, S., Santos Vara, J., Strik, T., 
(eds.), Constitutionalising the External Dimensions of  EU Migration Policies in Times of  Crisis: Legality, 
Rule of  Law and Fundamental Rights Reconsidered, 2019, Cheltenham, 2019, p. 155 ff.; gatti, M., 
ott, A., “The EU-Turkey Statement: legal nature and compatibility with EU institutional 
law”, in in Carrera, S., Santos Vara, J., Strik, T., (eds.), Constitutionalising... cit., p. 175 ff.
3 The Visegrád Group, (Visegrád Four, or V4), is a cultural and political alliance of  four countries of  
Central Europe  (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), all of  which are members of  the 
EU and of  NATO, to advance co-operation in military, cultural, economic and energy matters 
with one another and to further their integration to the EU.
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the government of  Tripoli on 2 February 20174, and the “disengagement” 
with respect to Search and Rescue activities at sea, gradually limiting the direct 
involvement and above all discouraging these operations by NGOs, “guilty” of  
attracting rescued persons to the Italian jurisdiction. The first act of  this phase 
can be considered the enactment of  the so called “Minniti Code” (from the 
name of  former Italian Minister of  Interior) of  July 2017, which set a series of  
rules to be followed by NGOs, through very questionable provisions5. Among 
the latter we would like to point out here, since it constitutes a precedent with 
respect to interpretation of  the right of  innocent passage by the regulations 
subsequently adopted in Italy, and on which we shall dwell, the commitment 
“not to enter Libyan territorial waters, except in situations of  serious and 
imminent danger that require immediate assistance, and not to hinder the 
activity of  Search and Rescue (SAR) by the Libyan Coast Guard, in order not to 
hamper the possibility of  intervention by the competent national Authorities 
in their territorial waters, in compliance with international obligations”. This 
is, of  course, an untenable demand for a ship flying a foreign flag, since it 
would be required not to exercise its right of  innocent passage through the 
territorial waters of  a third State! Subsequently, in perfect harmony with the 
political winds blowing through Europe and facilitated by the lack of  solidarity 
shown by the European Union’s partners in the management of  landings, the 
new Italian government undertook, starting in June 2018, a series of  measures 
aimed at closing ports to all vessels (in the case of  the ship Diciotti also to an 
Italian military ship!) with migrants on board, rescued at sea. And so, in 2018 
and 2019, the two so called “security decrees” arrived. These decrees provide, 
among other things, measures to combat the phenomenon of  irregular 
4 In comment to which reference should be made to Liguori, A., “The Externalization of  Border 
Controls and the Responsibility of  Outsourcing States under the European Convention on Human 
Rights”, Rivista di Diritto Internazionale, 2018, p. 1228 ff,; ID., Migration Law and The Externalisation 
of  Border Controls, Routledge, London and New York, 2019; SpagnoLo, A., “The Conclusion of  
Bilateral Agreements and Technical Arrangements for the Management of  Migration Flows: An 
Overview of  the Italian Practice”, Italian Yearbook of  International Law, 2018 p. 211 ff.
5 On the “Minniti Code” see raMaCCiotti, M., “Sulla utilità di un codice di condotta per le 
organizzazioni non governative impegnate in attività di Search and Rescue (SAR)”, Rivista di 
diritto internazionale, 2018, p. 213 ff.; ferri, f., “Il Codice di condotta per le ONG e i diritti 
dei migranti: fra diritto internazionale e politiche europee”, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 
2018, p. 189 ff.
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migration by sea at all costs, including through a progressive detachment from 
the international commitments undertaken, as we will try to demonstrate.
In the few pages that follow I would like to dwell in particular on a single 
aspect of  the “security decree bis” (n. 53/19 converted by law n. 77 of  8 
August 2019) which concerns the interpretation of  the right of  innocent 
passage in the territorial sea, an institution codified by the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of  the Sea signed in Montego Bay in 1982 (hereinafter 
UNCLOS) and ratified by Italy with law n. 689 of  22 December 1994.
II. RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE IN THE TERRITORIAL SEA
Article 1 of  the “security bis” decree inserts in Article 11 of  Legislative 
Decree No 286 of  25 July 1998, the new paragraph 1-ter by which it attributes 
to the Minister of  the Interior, in his capacity as national authority of  public 
security, in the exercise of  the coordination functions attributed to him by 
law, the power to restrict or prohibit the entry, transit or stopping of  ships 
in the territorial sea, with the exception of  military vessels and ships on non-
commercial government service, for reasons of  public order and security, or 
when he deems it necessary to prevent the “prejudicial” or “non-innocent” 
passage of  a specific ship in relation to which the conditions set out in Article 
19, paragraph 2, letter g) of  UNCLOS can be fulfilled - limited to violations 
of  immigration laws.
The right of  innocent passage, referred to in Articles 17 et seq. UNCLOS, 
consists of  the right of  each State to transit with its ships (private and public) 
through foreign territorial seas provided that such transit is harmless, i.e. does 
not disturb the “peace, good order and security” of  the coastal State6. This is 
provided for in Article 19, first paragraph, UNCLOS, which reproduces the 
same rule contained in Article 14 of  the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea. In the second paragraph, however, Article 19 UNCLOS, unlike 
the 1958 version, lists a series of  activities whose commission by the foreign 
ship automatically renders its passage not innocent. One of  the activities is 
the one mentioned in Article 1 of  the decree in question, namely “the loading 
or unloading of  materials, currency or persons in violation of  customs, tax, 
health or immigration laws and regulations in force in the coastal state”.
6 On the Right of  innocent passage see CataLDi, G., “Il passaggio delle navi straniere nel mare 
territoriale”, Giuffré, Milano, 1990.
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The right of  passage belongs to any vessel which enters the territorial 
waters of  a foreign State only for the purpose of  crossing them, whether 
it subsequently enters the internal waters of  that State (incoming passage), 
comes from those waters with the intent of  reaching other destinations 
(outgoing passage) or, finally, only transits parallel to the coast, without 
entering the internal waters (lateral passage). The passage must be rapid and 
continuous, save for the exceptions provided for in the last part of  art. 18, par. 
2, UNCLOS: activities necessary for ordinary navigation and, what is more 
relevant in our case, situations of  force majeure, danger and need to provide 
assistance to ships and aircraft in danger.
I believe this necessarily synthetic description of  the institute is sufficient 
to reveal the perplexities raised by the formulation of  Art. 1. Such article, in 
fact, provides for two distinct hypotheses with regard to the power to limit or 
prohibit the entry, transit or stopping of  ships in the territorial sea: either for 
reasons of  order and public safety, or when the passage is prejudicial or not 
innocent under Art. 19, para 2, letter g) UNCLOS. However, it is not clear how 
the two hypotheses can be distinguished. In other words, Art. 19 UNCLOS 
allows “for reasons of  public order and safety” to restrict or prohibit the 
passage of  a foreign ship. The assumption is that such passage is not innocent. 
Consequently, the passage of  ships exercising the right of  innocent passage 
cannot, as a general rule, be prevented, while measures can be taken to prevent 
non-innocent passage (Art. 25 UNCLOS). The special provision included in 
Article 11 of  Legislative Decree no. 286 of  25 July 1998 certainly cannot give 
new and additional powers to limit the right of  innocent passage beyond those 
already provided for under Articles 19 and 25 UNCLOS and which constitute 
the perimeter within which the coastal State can take action against the foreign 
ship. It is worth remembering that the existence of  a primary legal framework 
obviously does not change the system of  supranational sources (ratified by 
Italy) within which such measures are inserted and with which they are required 
to comply pursuant to Art. 10, 11 and 117 of  the Italian Constitution. This is 
also expressly provided for by the decree in question, which contains a specific 
reference to the necessary “compliance with international obligations”.
What, therefore, is the rationale upon which the rule in Article 1 is based, 
given that it is not possible to introduce new limits to the right of  innocent 
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passage, nor is it conceivable that the purpose is a mere restatement of  those 
principles?
The answer must necessarily take account of  practice in implementing 
this provision. As it appears from the cases that have occurred so far, the 
will of  the legislator appears to be the following: except for  cases in which 
the Italian coastal authorities have expressly authorized the entry into the 
territorial sea of  a ship with migrants rescued on board, such entry is to be 
considered contrary to “public order and public safety”, since the absence of  
authorization means, in the light of  the rules on search and rescue at sea that 
we shall soon examine, refusal to assign the POS (Place of  Safety), a refusal 
based, in this case, on the responsibility of  another State. This will to qualify 
the passage ex ante as innocent or not is therefore functional to the policy of  
“closure of  national ports”.
The measure of  port closure is not in itself  excluded by the law of  the sea, 
since ports fall within the exclusive sovereignty of  the State. There is no right 
of  entry into a foreign port under international law, since the port is located 
in internal waters, and unless an international agreement has been reached, the 
coastal State may choose whether or not to admit a foreign ship (unlike the 
territorial sea, where all States enjoy the right of  innocent passage). Article 25 
of  UNCLOS also provides that the State may refuse entry if  the ship violates 
national immigration regulations. However, any ship has the right to enter a 
port if  it is itself  in a situation of  distress, or if  the persons on board are in 
difficulty. In this case, the rule of  “force majeure” or the “state of  necessity”, 
already provided for and codified by the 1923 Convention on the Regime 
of  Sea Ports, applies. In these cases, the refusal to accept a ship into a port 
constitutes a violation of  the duty to safeguard human life at sea, unless a 
simple intervention (e.g. medical or mechanical repair) carried out on board 
can be sufficient to put an end to the state of  necessity, without proceeding 
to the entry into the port. In the specific case of  possible asylum seekers on 
board, when the ship is in internal waters and therefore under the jurisdiction 
of  the coastal State, said coastal State must verify, person by person, whether 
or not the requirements have been met, otherwise it would be in violation of  
its obligations according to human rights standards, in particular the obligation 
of  “non-refoulement” under the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees and 
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the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as interpreted by the 
Court of  Strasbourg.
Therefore, the entry into the territorial sea of  a ship carrying people already 
rescued in fulfilment of  the international obligation to save human life at sea is 
legitimate, and must be considered as an innocent passage, because landing in 
a Place of  Safety is functional to the completion of  rescue operations; in the 
same way, obviously, the entry into the territorial sea in order to rescue people 
in danger at that moment must be considered as an innocent passage. Neither 
of  the two activities can be considered to have been carried out in violation of  
national immigration laws, provided that the purpose of  the ship is related to 
the rescue obligations. On this point, Italian case law is abundant and almost 
unanimous7.
III. RESCUE OBLIGATIONS
A few words on rescue obligations. They are first of  all embodied in 
Article 98 UNCLOS, which codifies a very ancient principle of  customary 
law, namely the obligation to rescue persons in distress at sea, without any 
geographical indication or limitation, and also specifying the need for the State 
7 Among the many decisions: Court of  Agrigento 7 October 2009, no. 954 in the Cap Anamur 
case; request for dismissal of  the Palermo Public Prosecutor’s Office,15 June 2018, in the 
case involving the ship Golfo Azzurro of  the NGO Iuventa; Court of  Ragusa, office for 
preliminary investigation decree of  rejection of  the request for preventive seizure, 16 April 
2018, confirmed by the Ragusa Court of  Review (Tribunale del riesame), 11 May 2018 in the 
Open Arms case; Corte di Cassazione, Criminal section I, judgment 27 March 2014, no. 14510 
and Corte di Cassazione, Criminal section IV, judgment 30 March 2018, no. 14709, which 
on the subject of  the subsistence of  Italian jurisdiction in relation to conduct, alternatively 
qualified as humanitarian aid operations or aiding and abetting illegal immigration, which took 
place on the high seas, noted that “the rescue intervention is a duty under the International 
Conventions on the Law of  the Sea”; Court of  Catania, 7 December 2018, which with 
reference to the Diciotti case underlines that “the obligation to save life at sea is a precise 
duty of  States and prevails over all bilateral rules and agreements aimed at combating irregular 
immigration”; GIP (Judge for the preliminary investigation) of  Trapani, decision 3 June 2019, 
in the Vos-Thalassa case, which recognizes the exemption of  legitimate defense in the case of  
migrants rescued and protested with force the compulsory accompaniment to Libya; Corte di 
Cassazione, Criminal section I, 23 January 2015, n. 3345, on the subject of  “mediated author”, 
i.e. rescue operations provoked by the same smugglers who determine the responsibility of  
the latter but certainly not of  those who provide rescue at sea.
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to promote “the establishment, operation and maintenance of  an adequate 
and effective search and rescue service”8.
More detailed are the provisions of  the 1974 International Convention 
for the Safety of  Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the 1979 Hamburg Convention on 
Search and Rescue at Sea (SAR). These two conventions were amended in 2004, 
following the case of  the Norwegian ship Tampa, which in 2001 picked up 438 
Afghan asylum seekers at sea but was banned by the Australian authorities from 
entering their ports for more than a week, generating a diplomatic crisis with 
Norway, until the situation was resolved by “outsourcing” the management 
of  the matter to the State of  Nauru, which accepted the asylum seekers in 
exchange for money9. In particular, the 20 May 2004 IMO (International 
Maritime Organisation) Maritime Safety Committee Resolution made it clear 
that the Search and Rescue operation only ends with the disembarkation (in 
the shortest possible time and with the minimum possible diversion of  the 
voyage undertaken by the rescuer ship) of  the rescued persons in a safe place; 
that the government responsible for the SAR region where the survivors were 
recovered is required to identify the safe place of  disembarkation and to either 
provide it directly or ensure that it is provided by another state; that a safe 
place cannot be considered as the ship performing the rescue, except for a 
limited time, and that neighboring coastal states, as well as the flag state and 
any state involved (e.g. because it is the nation state of  the majority of  the crew 
or passengers) cannot be considered to be exempted from liability, especially 
8 “1. Every State shall require the master of  a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so 
without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: (a) to render assistance to any 
person found at sea in danger of  being lost; (b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue 
of  persons in distress, if  informed of  their need of  assistance, in so far as such action may 
reasonably be expected of  him; (c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, its 
crew and its passengers and, where possible, to inform the other ship of  the name of  his own 
ship, its port of  registry and the nearest port at which it will call. 2. Every coastal State shall 
promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of  an adequate and effective search 
and rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea and, where circumstances so require, 
by way of  mutual regional arrangements cooperate with neighbouring States for this purpose”.
9 Incidentally, this is the so-called “Pacific Solution”, i.e. specific to the Pacific Ocean, which 
inspired many European governments that, by their own admission, consider it as a good 
practice to imitate. On this case see BaiLLiet C., “The ‘Tampa’ Case and Its Impact on Burden 
Sharing at Sea”, Human Rights Quarterly, 2003, p. 741 ff.
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if  the government responsible for the SAR region is unwilling or unable to 
intervene.
With regard to the latter, it should be stressed that the concern has been, 
especially since 2004, to broaden as far as possible the “titles” of  competence 
and thus the scope of  the States potentially responsible. The rules of  the 
two SOLAS and SAR Conventions, as well as IMO recommendations, are 
based on cooperation (“the coordination by one state of  rescue action does 
not free other states”, as the IMO states in its recommendations). In fact, the 
first maritime rescue centre that becomes aware of  a case of  danger, even if  
the event affects the SAR area of  another country, must take the necessary 
urgent action and then continue to coordinate the rescue until the authority 
responsible for the area takes over the coordination. The State to which the 
Coordination Centre which first received the news, or which has in any case 
taken over the coordination of  the rescue operations, has the obligation 
to identify a safe place on its territory where the rescue operations can be 
completed by the disembarkation of  the shipwrecked persons, provided that 
it is not possible to reach agreements with a State that may be closer to the 
area of  the event, regardless of  any consideration regarding the status of  the 
shipwrecked persons.
It is equally clear, however, that there are two problems with the application 
of  these rules in the central Mediterranean. The first is that Malta, which has 
a very large SAR area, has not, however, ratified the 2004 amendments and, in 
view of  the limits of  its territory and the means at its disposal, it disputes its 
competence to direct rescue operations in its SAR (unless Maltese flag vessels 
are involved, which is a very rare hypothesis), which, moreover, overlaps with 
the Italian one in several places.
Different but no less problematic is the issue of  the Libyan SAR. This 
country, which still lacks an effective government that controls the entire 
territory, although it has declared that it has assumed responsibility for search 
and rescue in the (large) sea area north of  its coasts, does not even have an 
efficient coordination centre for rescue operations. Moreover, and most 
significantly, Libya cannot at this time be considered, by almost unanimous 
recognition, as a safe place of  landing from the point of  view of  protection of  
fundamental human rights. Indeed, it is clear that the place of  disembarkation 
is understood as “safe” when both physical security and the enjoyment of  
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human rights are no longer in danger. Corollary to this principle is the right, 
as well as the obligation, to provide the Place of  Safety, a right to which the 
rescued persons are entitled10.
The obligation to save human life at sea, therefore, is obligatory for both 
States (according to art. 98, par. 1 UNCLOS) and masters of  ships (according 
to Chapter V, reg. 33 SOLAS, as well as national rules on the matter, such 
as for example art. 489 of  Italian navigation code). This obligation requires 
the master to assist persons in distress and take them to a safe place “in the 
shortest possible time” 11. In other words, the event of  rescue at sea continues 
until the master has disembarked the persons in a safe place, and its entry 
into the territorial sea and ports of  a State cannot be seen in a different light. 
The passage of  a ship which has rescued persons in distress, even outside 
the territorial sea, cannot therefore be precluded if  the ship intends to enter 
in order to finalize its obligation to save human life at sea. This is required 
by the conventional rules on the rescue and salvage of  persons at sea already 
mentioned, which provide for coordination between the States involved. 
Thus the inaction or failure by other States to fulfil their obligations is wholly 
without merit.
Consequently, there can be no automatic refusal of  the right of  passage 
by virtue of  its preventive qualification as not harmless if  the vessel hosts 
persons rescued at sea. Correctly, the Court of  Palermo, section for ministerial 
crimes, by decision of  January 30, 2020 acknowledged (on p. 37), that art. 11 
paragraph 1 ter inserted in Legislative Decree 286/98 can only be interpreted, 
in the light of  UNCLOS rules cited, as meaning that the prohibition of  
entry must refer “only to cases of  illegal immigration not related to a rescue 
operation at sea”. As a result, the Court asked the Senate for authorization to 
10 In this regard, see the clear statements of  the GIP of  Trapani, cit. For the doctrine please 
refer to SCovazzi, T., “Human Rights and Immigration at Sea”, in Rubio-Marín, R., (ed.), 
Human Rights and Immigration, OUP, Oxford, 2014, p. 225 ff.
11 On the obligations and the right/duty of  the master of  the ship to obey international 
law, and on the relationship with the competence of  the State, please refer to De vittor, 
F., Starita, M., “Distributing Responsibility between Shipmasters and the Different States 
Involved in SAR Disasters”, Italian Yearbook of  Int. Law, 2018, p. 82 ff.; Starita, M., “Il dovere 
di soccorso in mare e il diritto di obbedire al diritto (internazionale) del comandante della nave 
privata”, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2019, p. 5 ff.
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proceed against former Interior Minister Salvini in the case of  the Spanish-
flagged Open Arms vessel chartered by the NGO “Pro-Activa Open Arms”.
Paradoxically, with its initiatives, the Italian government conformed with 
the idea, which was at the basis of  the European “rejection” of  the 2013 
Italian Mare Nostrum operation, but is completely contradicted by  practice, 
according to which an effective Search and Rescue activity provides an incentive 
(“taxi effect” as defined at the time of  Mare Nostrum) to departures12. In 
this regard, it is necessary to recall what has already been said, namely that 
the international obligations mentioned, in particular Article 98 UNCLOS, 
commit States to carry out search and rescue activities directly, to this end 
promoting “the establishment and permanent operation of  an adequate and 
effective search and rescue service to protect maritime and air safety”. In the 
motion for a resolution submitted to the European Parliament on 21 October 
2019 by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, “on 
Search and Rescue in the Mediterranean”13, and rejected by 290 votes against, 
288 in favour and 36 abstentions,  the following is emphasized: NGOs rescuing 
migrants were nominated in 2018 for the Sakharov Prize; after the Italian 
operation Mare Nostrum (ceased on 31 October 2014) there were no State 
SAR actions in the Central Mediterranean; and finally on 26 September 2019 
the EU Operation Sophia was extended until 31 March 2020 but only for air 
operations. Therefore, NGOs have limited themselves to occupying a space 
left (maliciously) free by States reluctant to fulfil their obligations and thus 
creating problems for commercial navigation. In a statement of  11 June 2018, 
the International Chamber of  Shipping in London (the World Shipowners’ 
Association) not incidentally pointed out that “if  NGO ships are unable to 
land people rescued in Italy in Italian ports, this will also have significant 
consequences for merchant ships (...), which will again have to participate in 
12 See in this regard the paper by CuSuMano, E., and viLLa, M., “Sea Rescue NGOs: a Pull 
Factor of  Irregular Migration?”, in Policy Brief. Migration Policy Centre. Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies. European University Institute, Issue 2019/22, November 2019. The authors, 
basing their research on data and facts, effectively demonstrate how wrong this assumption is. 
More in general, on the relationship between NGOs and Italian authorities on the subject, refer 
to BeviLaCqua, G., “Italy versus NGOs: The controversial Interpretation and Implementation 
of  Search and Rescue Obligations in the context of  Migration at Sea”, Italian Yearbook of  
International Law, 2018, p. 11 ff.
13 2019/2755(RSPP)B9-0154/2019, Recovered from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/
document/B-9-20190154_EN.html9.
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a significant number of  rescues”. The Italian “security decree bis” therefore 
violates the spirit and the letter of  the international rules mentioned so far 
from two different points of  view. First because there is a clear prejudice with 
respect to the rescue activities of  NGOs, and secondly because the ultimate 
goal is, once again, the idea that the landing should take place “anywhere 
except in Italy”. In fact, in this regard, it should be remembered that, on 
various occasions, different arguments have indicated that a State other than 
Italy is competent: in the case of  the ship Mare Jonio, flying the Italian flag, the 
initial responsibility for landing, according to the Italian authorities, did not lie 
with the flag State but with the State of  the nearest port. Furthermore, it was 
claimed that since the vessel was not in the Italian SAR, it was not possible for 
the POS to be identified in an Italian port! On the contrary, the priority of  a 
rescue vessel landing in its own flag State was already invoked by the Italian 
Government in events involving the vessels Aquarius (UK flag), Sea Watch 3 
(Netherlands), Open Arms (Spain). In the latter case, reference was also made 
to the nearest port (Malta), and the country of  the SAR region (Libya), while 
in the case of  the refusal of  Italian ports to the vessel Aquarius, reference was 
made, as an alternative to the flag (UK), to the ownership of  the vessel or the 
nationality of  the NGO (France), or to the waters where the vessel was located 
at the time of  the ministerial declarations (Malta).
The infringement to the letter of  the international rules on the subject 
emerges, as we have attempted to demonstrate, from the claim to qualify 
a priori as offensive the passage into the territorial sea of  ships engaged in 
“unauthorized” rescue operations. In this regard, it should be recalled, first 
of  all, that, despite the different interpretations that States have reserved to 
the relevant provisions of  UNCLOS (Articles 17 - 26), the right of  innocent 
passage without the need for prior authorization is, in fact, recognized to 
all foreign ships, including warships, even by States which, during the Third 
Conference on the Law of  the Sea as well as in their domestic laws, had 
affirmed the need for authorization by the coastal State or prior notification 
of  passage. This conclusion is further supported, in the most recent practice, 
by the attitude of  States such as Finland or Sweden, which have abandoned 
their original position in favour of  the legitimacy of  the imposition by the 
coastal State of  the obligation of  prior notification of  passage; at the time of  
ratification of  UNCLOS, in fact, they have not deposited any interpretative 
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declaration in this respect. A development in customary law in the sense of  
the legitimacy of  at least the condition of  prior notification of  the passage 
of  nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying radioactive or other intrinsically 
hazardous or noxious substances has, in our view, occurred in recent years, 
mainly as a result of  the practice of  European States, but this is in the light 
of  an increased sensitivity to values of  common interest, and we stress 
values of  common interest, such as health and the environment14. However, 
the requirement for authorisation to transit remains a practice considered 
incompatible with freedom of  navigation.
At the time of  writing, various appeals are pending before the Constitutional 
Court in order to have this new legislation declared unconstitutional. In the 
political arena, amendments are being discussed, in particular with a Project 
of  Law (Decree-Law no. 130 of  21.10.2020 on security and immigration) 
which deletes article 1 of  the so called “security decree bis”. According to the 
Project, the Minister of  the Interior may still restrict or prohibit the entry into 
or the transit through territorial waters of  non-military or non-commercial 
government vessels. However, the Decree provides for an exception to this 
prohibition or limit of  navigation in the case of  ships which have carried out 
rescue operations in accordance with international conventions, and which 
have communicated their operations to the competent national authorities or 
their flag state. In other cases, on the other hand, of  “non-compliance with the 
prohibition or limit of  navigation”, fines ranging from 10,000 to 50,000 euros 
are imposed. It is reminded that, at present, in case of  violation of  the above 
mentioned prohibition, an administrative fine is foreseen, with a limit higher 
than the fine contemplated in the Project (up to one million for those who 
rescue migrants at sea). Finally, in the Project, the seizure of  the vessel which 
enters territorial waters in an irregular way is no longer foreseen.
Anyway, as the conditions legitimising the closure of  ports and territorial 
waters remain essentially the same in the Project, i.e. the “reasons of  public 
order and safety” (with reference to Article 83 of  Italian Navigation Code), or 
the occurrence of  the “conditions referred to in Article 19, paragraph 2, letter 
g), UNCLOS, limited to violations of  immigration laws”, our critics on the 
improper interpretation of  the right of  innocent passage remain unchanged.
14 On this point please refer to CataLDi, G., « Problèmes généraux de la navigation en Europe », 
in Casado Raigon, R., (ed.), Europe et la mer, II Colloque de l’Association internationale du droit de la 
mer, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005, p. 127 ff.
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In conclusion, it should be reaffirmed that the means used to cross the 
Mediterranean, and the factual circumstances, lead, ab initio, to a state of  
necessity and therefore the application of  the customary rule on the duty to 
render assistance codified in Article 98 UNCLOS. Especially in the light of  
the absence of  direct state intervention, the legality of  the actions carried 
out by NGOs is beyond doubt. It is worth remembering that according to 
the Missing Migrants Project of  the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), of  the 3,514 people who died in 2017 in an attempt to emigrate, 
whose identity has been verified, as many as 2,510 have lost their lives in the 
Mediterranean. Moreover, despite a significant drop in arrivals, the route from 
Libya to Europe remains, according to UNHCR, the deadliest migration route 
in the world. In 2018 it was five times more fatal than in 2015, mainly due to 
the reduction in search and rescue activities off  the Libyan coast. These figures 
need no comment. Consequently, the automatic denial of  the right of  passage 
under the administrative measures issued in application of  the “security bis 
decree” is illegitimate because it is incompatible with the international rules 
on the matter (art. 17 ff. UNCLOS). This refusal, while recalling Italy’s SAR 
obligations, is motivated by an alleged intention to land irregular migrants, 
on the basis of  actions carried out “in full autonomy”. The entry into the 
territorial sea, on the other hand, when linked to the Search and Rescue 
activity and to the right/duty that a POS be assigned, is, as such, perfectly 
legitimate.  With regard to that part of  the “security decree bis” which deals 
with search and rescue at sea, in our humble opinion there is a need for a 
profound change, in light of  the evident contradiction with the functioning of  
the international rules on the subject, as is also apparent from the absolutely 
prevailing Italian jurisprudence, which continues to affirm the primacy of  
legality, both domestic and international, without surrendering to pressures of  
alleged exceptional necessity and urgency15.
15 In addition to the case law cited above, see recently Court of  Cassation, 3rd Criminal 
Chamber, judgment No 112 of  20 February 2020, in the case of  Carola Rackete, commander 
of  the vessel Sea Watch 3. For the Supreme Court, the latter, from the beginning to the end of  
the rescue operations, acted in full compliance with the obligations imposed by international 
law, including therefore the decision not to comply with the prohibition to enter the territorial 
sea and an Italian port (prohibition issued in execution of  the “security decree bis”), forcing 
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This being said, we must not forget that these inacceptable initiatives put 
in place by Italian government, and at present under a process of  revision, 
are also the consequences of  the attitude of  EU Institutions and other EU 
State Members toward the unprecedented migratory pressure started with 
the year 2015 in Europe. This pressure, in fact, put into question the very 
structure of  the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). As it is well 
known, in fact, according to the so-called Dublin regime, the country of  first 
entrance is responsible for carrying out the asylum procedure leaving it open 
how the burden that the granting of  asylum involves should eventually be 
shared between the EU Member States. Both the 1951 United Nations Geneva 
Convention relating to the Status of  Refugees (GCR 1951) and the CEAS are 
built upon the implicit assumption that refugee protection should be of  a 
temporary nature, but in reality, protection has most often become permanent. 
Migration through the Mediterranean has to be considered nowadays no 
more as an “emergency”. In order to avoid excessive burdens for front-line 
states in Europe, Italy in particular, and for Europe as a whole, the call for 
the introduction of  burden-sharing mechanisms is becoming ever louder. In 
this context, quota systems have been presented as ideal problem solution 
instruments. As Mediterranean Coastal States had demanded solidarity, the 
European Union has tried to establish such mechanisms, both in carrying out 
SAR operations and in relocating rescued people, but so far all these attempts 
proved to be insufficient and they met with considerable resistance by some 
EU Member States. With its Judgment of  2 April 2020, the European Court of  
Justice (Third Chamber) assessed that even the temporary measures adopted 
in 2015 with two Council decisions relocating some asylum seekers from 
Greece and Italy16, following the so-called refugee crisis, have been breached 
by several Member States. Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, in particular, 
had violated Member States’ obligation to indicate at regular intervals, and at 
least every three months, the number of  applicants for international protection 
who can be relocated swiftly to their territory.
the “blockade” opposed by the military authorities and leading the migrants rescued on 12 
June 2019 to a safe place for disembarkation.
16 Council decision (EU) 2015/1523 of  14 September 2015 and Council decision (EU) 
2015/1601 of  22 September 2015, both establishing provisional measures in the area of  
international protection for the benefit of  Italy and of  Greece.
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The first urgency is always to save lives at sea, but at present border 
surveillance and the fight against trafficking and smuggling of  migrants seem 
to be the priorities in EU policy and action. The new models, in particular 
the Statement agreed with Turkey, do not convince from a legal point of  
view, mainly because refugees deserve a special attention, based on the “non-
réfoulement” principle. The time has come to exit the logic of  emergency and 
formulate a lasting policy to manage migrations, implementing Lisbon Treaty 
and Fundamental Rights Charter’s principles based on solidarity and respect 
of  human rights, as well as on true cooperation among States.
The European Commission acknowledges finally that solidarity has been 
lacking. The Commission has stated, inter alia, in the “Proposal for an Asylum 
and Migration management Regulation”17, that «in 2019, half  of  all irregular 
arrival by sea were disembarked following search and rescue operations putting 
a particular strain on certain Member States solely due to their geographical 
position». This new “Pact on asylum and migration” (as it has been defined 
by the Commission, hereafter Pact) adopted by the European Commission 
on 23 September 2020 addresses once again the problem of  the burden 
posed by continuing disembarkations on EU Mediterranean States, on their 
asylum systems, by introducing «a new solidarity mechanism for situations of  
search and rescue, pressure and crises». It promises more resources for SAR 
activities and asks for a coordinated approach towards NGOs carrying out 
SAR operations18.
But how does the Pact address the imbalances created by the continuing 
disembarkations on the distribution of  the responsibility for examining 
the applications for international protection? Notwithstanding its highly 
controversial character, the centrality of  the entry criterion (which has worked 
so far as a kind of  “default” criterion, putting on Mediterranean border States 
the responsibility for examining the most part of  applications presented by 
17 Brussels, 23.9.2020 COM (2020) 610 final 2020/0279 (COD). Proposal for a Regulation 
of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on Asylum and Migration management and 
amending Council Directive (EC) 2003/109.
18 For a more in-depth analysis of  the Pact, see M. Starita, “Search and Rescue Operations under 
the New Pact on Asylum and Migration”, available at http://www.sidiblog.org, 8 November 
2020; Maiani, F., A “ ‘Fresh Start’ or One More Clunker? Dublin and Solidarity in the New Pact”, 
Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 20 October 2020, recovered from: https://eumigrationlawblog.
eu/a-fresh-start-or-one-more-clunker-dublin-and-solidarity-in-the-new-pact/.
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persons disembarked following SAR operations as well as, more generally, by 
persons spontaneously arriving at the borders of  these States by sea) remains 
in the proposal for an asylum and migration management, whose Article 21, 
paragraph 1, reproduces Article 13, paragraph 1, of  the Dublin III Regulation. 
Furthermore, to avoid misunderstandings, paragraph 2 of  Article 21 expressly 
states that «the rule set out in paragraph 1 shall also apply where the applicant 
was disembarked on the territory following a search and rescue operation». 
There are however some changes in the responsibility criteria: The Commission 
introduces a new criterion, expanding the possibilities to allocate applicants 
based on their “meaningful links” with Member States: for example, prior 
education in a Member State (article 20), and family reunification according 
with article 2 (g) which includes siblings in the definition of  family. Although 
interesting and welcome, these changes do not seem able to prevent future 
imbalances in the distribution of  the responsibility of  examining applications 
for international protection, in particular applications by persons rescued at 
sea.
The Commission’s remedy to imbalances is essentially left to the so 
called “solidarity mechanisms”. These mechanisms work through a complex 
procedure (Articles 47-49), which is essentially framed in three stages. First, 
each year the Commission shall adopt a Migration Management Report 
«setting out the anticipated evolution of  the migration situation and the 
preparedness of  the Union and the Member States». Secondly, Member 
States are invited to notify the contributions they intend to make, given a 
“distribution key” previously established by the Commission on the basis of  
the size of  population and the total GDP (Article 54). However, States are 
not obliged to offer their contributions in terms of  relocations, but are free to 
combine, respecting their distribution key, relocations and other contributions 
(capacity-building, operations support, cooperation with third States). Thirdly, 
the Commission assembles a “solidarity pool”, considering the contributions 
offered by the Member States.
Even if  these changes seem deserving a positive evaluation, it must 
be underlined that these solidarity mechanisms shall apply only after 
disembarkations have taken place. This clearly reduces the capacity of  solidarity 
mechanisms to alleviate the pressure over border States’national asylum 
systems. Also, the solidarity procedures leave wide room for manoeuvre to 
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negotiations between Member States. Finally, the Commission’s decision on 
whether a Member State is under “a migratory pressure”, or a “crisis” in the 
migration flow, is highly discretionary.
It is evident that the Pact is, as usual, the output of  an effort to combine 
EU Mediterranean States’ positions with those of  their European partners, 
in an effort of  realpolitik.19 This is understandable, but, once again, the 
uniformity of  legal obligations among Member States is not guaranteed and 
the actual sacrifice imposed on the Mediterranean States (who are requested to 
accept again the “entry” criterion as the default one in determining the State 
responsible for examining asylum applications) is balanced only by a promise 
of  solidarity whose fulfilment depends on two basic circumstances: on the one 
side, the way in which the Commission will use its highly discretional powers 
in the implementing procedures; on the one other side, the degree of  open-
handedness that the other Member, States will show in the solidarity forum. 
Precedents are not encouraging.
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